The Overton Window and the UK Local Elections (May 2025)

The large gains by the Reform Party in the UK and the attrition of voters from the Conservative Party have been analysed by political commentators and the media through different lenses. This article seeks to consider the Overton Window as a tool to assess how much further the UK electorate is willing to shift, and to examine what these developments signal about the future of British politics.

When the Labour Party came to power with an overwhelming majority in 2024, there were few transparent signs that its political trajectory would closely align with that of its Conservative predecessor. Yet, within months, key policy positions and rhetorical framing—particularly around asylum seekers, public spending, and national identity—began to echo previous Conservative strategies. Terminology, symbolic gestures, virtue signalling and narratives about supposed burdens on public services became a common theme. If we consider the Overton Window, Labour has used the tactic of floating proposals via the media, monitoring the response, and then shifting the dial further right once a baseline of public tolerance is established.

This sequence was evident in NHS policy: beginning with talk of “reform,” then announcing the abolition of NHS England as a commissioning body, and later signalling substantial job cuts in the civil service and local health commissioning boards. The figures began at 50% before rising to 7000 to 10000 and the latest count is 30000 posts (in public sector healthcare) in total (The Guardian, March 2025). Framed not as austerity, but as “modernisation,” these shifts were made with little opposition possibly due to Labour’s parliamentary dominance and the absence of sustained counter-narratives, however hard evidence would need to be evaluated to determine the precise pressure points that has enabled decision-making shifts such as this.

This approach aligns with what political scientist Peter A. Hall (1993) described as “second-order change”—where the tools of governance remain familiar but their function and goals shift fundamentally. It also resonates with agenda-setting theory (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), where media and political actors shape not only what people think about, but what they consider politically possible. This theory is also covered by theorists such as Edward Bernays (see Propaganda, 1928).

The Overton Window—introduced by Joseph Overton in the 1990s—describes the range of policies deemed acceptable to the mainstream. Those outside this window are viewed as radical or unthinkable. Importantly, the window is not fixed; it can shift in response to public sentiment, elite framing, and media narratives. The Overton Window is not a metric that can describe everything about politics. It tells us that politicians will not support whatever policy they want, but rather they will only support policies that they believe will get them reelected. Overton’s concept is best visualised as a spectrum (note: the image is subject to Copyright of the original creator).

In the UK context, the current alignment of the Labour and Conservative Parties around restrictive migration policies, austerity-lite economic plans, anti-trans rhetoric and diluted climate targets suggests that the Overton Window has shifted significantly rightward. The Reform Party has capitalised on this by offering policies that extend even further along this trajectory.

Strategic narrative shaping

The Labour government’s approach to media management—launching trial proposals, gauging public reaction, and shifting discourse incrementally—has moved what was once considered controversial into the realm of policy consensus. The abolition of NHS commissioner NHS England, escalating job cuts, and hardline migration rhetoric illustrate this tactic clearly. This has left the Conservative Party with limited ideological space, inadvertently creating room for Reform UK to occupy the far-right lane more overtly.

The question of consent

A pressing question remains: why, in the face of an environmental crisis and growing inequality, have many voters turned not to the Green Party or the Liberal Democrats or other independent candidates but to Reform UK? There are several overlapping factors:

1. Cultural resonance: Reform UK appeals to emotionally charged narratives about sovereignty, control, and national pride—more so than policy-based appeals by Green or Liberal parties. Perhaps they have reconnected with those that supported their narrative and voted to leave the European Union.
2. Perceived pragmatism: Under first-past-the-post, Green policies may appear idealistic or electorally futile. Voters seeking disruption are more likely to back a party seen as politically potent, even if divisive.
3. Media framing: Climate action is often presented as an economic threat rather than an existential need, weakening the electoral appeal of pro-environment platforms.
4. Protest voting: Many who voted Reform may not fully support their platform but want to register discontent with a political elite they perceive as detached or complacent.

This aligns with Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) theory of hegemony, where meaning is constructed through dominant chains of equivalence. In this case, Reform has managed to link economic decline, cultural change, and elite betrayal into a coherent narrative of political insurgency.

Consequences

The convergence of Labour and Conservative strategies has eroded the traditional landscape. The centre has not held—instead, it has narrowed or perhaps been obliterated. This has allowed Reform UK to position itself as the only right-wing alternative, while parties advocating social and ecological transformation remain largely marginalised.

If the Overton Window continues to operate as a narrow platform extending only rightward, the diversity of democratic debate is at risk. The absence of a robust, mainstream left alternative contributes to the erosion of pluralism and civic imagination. This raises urgent questions about how political consent is being manufactured—and what is needed to recalibrate the public’s sense of what is possible, desirable, and just.

References

Hall, P. A. (1993). ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics, 25(3), 275–296.

Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso.

McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (1972) ‘The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187.
Overton, J. P. (1990s) Mackinac Center for Public Policy. (Conceptual framework widely cited in public discourse).

The Guardian (2025) ‘30,000 jobs could go in Labour’s radical overhaul of NHS’, Campbell, D, The Guardian online, 14 March 2025.

Note to readers: This article is a theoretical and interpretive analysis grounded in political theory and media studies. It is non-partisan and intended to provoke reflection and debate about the structures of consent, power, and policy discourse in contemporary Britain.